

We use cookies on this site to enhance your user experience

OK, I agree

By clicking any link on this page you are giving your consent for us to set cookies. No, give me more info



Search the site

STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE

The independent resource on global security

Home	Research ▼	Databases	Publications	SIPRI Yearbook ▼
News and Events ▼	Media ▼	Commentary ▼	About ▼	

Armament and disarmament / Arms and military expenditure

Military expenditure





Photo: Shutterstock

The core work of the military expenditure project is to collect, analyse, process and publish data on military expenditure worldwide, and to monitor and analyse trends in military expenditure over time, looking at their economic, political and security drivers and their implications for global peace, security and development.

The military expenditure project is fundamentally data driven. At the heart of the project is SIPRI's unique, freely available, [military expenditure database](#). The database is updated annually, both with new data for the most recent year and with revisions to past data to take account of new information and ensure consistency over time.




A second key aspect of the work of the military expenditure project is to study issues relating to transparency and accountability in military budgeting, spending and procurement. Such transparency is often quite weak, which can affect the reliability of data, but which more seriously can lead to wasteful and excessive spending, often unconnected to genuine security needs, and to widespread corruption.

Graphics gallery: Military expenditure 2022

THE SHARE OF WORLD MILITARY EXPENDITURE OF THE 15 COUNTRIES WITH THE HIGHEST SPENDING IN 2022

Others
18%





Related commentary



1 March 2023

Going private (equity): A new challenge to transparency in the arms industry

By Lorenzo Scarazzato, Madison Lipson

BLOG





2 February 2023

Japan's new military policies: Origins and implications

By Dr Jingdong Yuan

BLOG



2 February 2023

The proposed hike in Japan's military expenditure

By Xiao Liang, Dr Nan Tian

TOPICAL BACKGROUNDER

[more commentary ►](#)

Related publications

sipri SIPRI Insights on Peace and Security
No. 2023/07 June 2023

RUSSIA'S MILITARY EXPENDITURE DURING ITS WAR AGAINST UKRAINE

JULIAN COOPER

1. Introduction

This SIPRI Insights paper is devoted to an analysis of military expenditure by the Russian Federation during its war against Ukraine, and the sources of funding for that spending. The analysis here shows that the war has been fought in a way that makes the resource commitment to it unsustainable, not withstanding the tough sanctions imposed on Russia's economy. Moreover, in so far as it is possible, Russian President Vladimir Putin and the government maintain a business-as-usual approach, attempting to implement policy goals that predate the war. These include the set of 'national goals' for Russia in 2020 that Putin presented in July 2020 aimed at improving health, welfare and living standards.¹ Their importance is often restated, while the pursuit of 'technological sovereignty' – aimed at reducing Russia's dependence on the technologies of 'unfriendly powers' – is also seen as a central plank of Russian economic policy, frequently proclaimed by President Putin.²

From its outset, the expanded invasion that began on 24 February 2022 has been called a 'special military operation' ('specialnoye voyennoye operatsiya, SVO') by the Russian government. It has arguably been using this term to avoid the term 'war' in its communication with the Russian public. Yet it also reflects how the Russian government initially conceived the invasion: it was likely prepared as an operation involving not only the armed forces but also extensive engagement of the security services. From close analysis of the available evidence, including official documents captured by Ukrainian forces, it has been established that this plan was formulated first and foremost by Russia's security services and a core group within the Presidential Administration, supported by senior officials in the Ministry of Defence (MOD).³ Initial planning was undertaken by the Federal Security Service (FSB) and the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD).⁴ The use of 'special' is a standard feature of Russia's military terminology, indicating that non-MOD forces are involved – usually those of the security agencies. In particular the FSB, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Federal Protection Service. A good example is provided by the frequently used abbreviation 'svs', from

SUMMARY

- Russia's total military expenditure has increased sharply by full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, but not dramatically. Despite difficulty in accessing information on budget spending, total budgetary military spending in 2022 was estimated at \$44.8 billion roubles. This represents a 4 per cent increase on Russian gross domestic product. While military spending in early 2023 seemed to accelerate beyond the budgeted amount, the rate of spending can be shown to be similar to that in early 2022 and does not suggest any renewed surge.
- The Russian government is attempting to restrain spending on the war to maintain the domestic impact and enable the pursuit of other goals before the invasion. The Russian economy has faced a sharp decline in spending on military-related activities since the start of the invasion, which has opened the possibility of increasing expenditure on other priorities. The government considers it necessary to do this.

¹ Putin announced general development for Russia through 2030, January, 21 July 2020. ² See, for example, 'Technological sovereignty: Russia's path to economic development', IAN IANOVSKI, 11 Dec 2022. ³ 'Fomin and M. M. Ponomarev's Letter to Government Regarding Russia's Invasion of Ukraine', February 2022, SIPRI United Services Institute, London, 10 Nov 2022, p. 7. ⁴ 'Kobalovskiy et al. p. 11'.

sipri SIPRI Fact Sheet
April 2023

TRENDS IN WORLD MILITARY EXPENDITURE, 2022

NAN TIAN, DIEGO LOPEZ DA SILVA, XIAO LIANG, LORENZO SCARAZZATO, LUCIE BÉRAUD-SUDREAU AND ANA CAROLINA DE OLIVEIRA ASSIS

World military expenditure rose by 3.7 per cent in real terms in 2022, to reach a record high of \$224 billion. Global spending grew by 19 per cent over the decade 2012–22 and has risen every year since 2015 (see figure 1).

Russia's invasion of Ukraine was a major driver of the growth in spending in 2022. Military expenditure in Europe rose by 18 per cent during the year, which was the largest annual increase in total European spending in the post-cold war era. The exceptional growth was largely accounted for by substantial increases in Russian and Ukrainian spending, but many other European countries boosted their military budgets in 2022. Spending increases in parts of Asia and Oceania also contributed to the global growth in 2022.

This SIPRI Fact Sheet compares key regional and national military expenditure data for 2022 and trends over the decade 2012–22. The data, which replaces all military spending data previously published by SIPRI, comes from the updated SIPRI Military Expenditure Database.

KEY FACTS

- World military expenditure rose by 3.7 per cent in real terms in 2022, to reach a record high of \$224 billion (2022, the highest level ever recorded), SIPRI data.
- The world's military spending accounted for 2.2 per cent of global gross domestic product (GDP) in 2022.
- The five biggest spenders in 2022 were the United States, China, Russia, India and Saudi Arabia, who together accounted for 66 per cent of world military spending.
- The UK military spending increased by 0.7 per cent to \$67.7 billion in 2022. The total includes military aid to Ukraine, estimated at \$9.9 billion.
- In 2022, China's military spending rose for the 20th consecutive year, to reach \$292 billion.
- Russia's military spending increased by 68 per cent in 2022, to \$164.8 billion. This was equivalent to a 4.9 per cent of Russian GDP.
- Ukrainian military spending rose by 8.8 per cent to \$44.4 billion or 34 per cent of GDP in 2022. The total does not include military aid supplied to Ukraine.
- Military expenditure grew in four of the five regional regions in 2022. The largest increase was in Europe, by 18 per cent, followed by the Middle East (1.2 per cent), Asia and Oceania (0.2 per cent) and the Americas (0.1 per cent). Spending decreased in Africa (–0.8 per cent).

Figure 1. World military expenditure by region, 2012–2022. Note: The absence of data for the Soviet Union in 1993 means that its total can be calculated for that year. Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, April 2023.

sipri SIPRI Fact Sheet
March 2023

TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS, 2022

PIETER D. WEZEMAN, JUSTINE GADON AND SIMON T. WEZEMAN

Imports of major arms by European states rose by 4.7 per cent between 2017 and 2018–22, while the global volume of international arms transfers fell by 5.1 per cent (see figure 1).¹ There were decreases in arms transfers to Africa (–4.6 per cent), the Americas (–2.8 per cent), Asia and Oceania (–7.5 per cent) and the Middle East (–8.8 per cent) between the two periods. The five largest arms importers in 2018–22 were India, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Australia and China. The five largest arms exporters were the United States, Russia, France, China and Germany.

The war in Ukraine had only a limited impact on the total volume of arms transfers in 2018–22, but Ukraine did become a major importer of arms in 2022. In addition, most European states substantially increased their arms import orders and the war will have significant ramifications for future supplier–recipient arms trade relations globally.

From 13 March 2023 the freely accessible SIPRI Arms Transfers Database includes updated data on transfers of major arms for 1950–2022, which replaces all previous data on arms transfers published by SIPRI, based on the new data. This fact sheet presents global trends in arms exports and arms imports, and highlights selected issues related to transfers of major arms.

KEY FACTS

- The volume of international transfers of major arms in 2018–22 was 5.1 per cent lower than in 2013–17 and 4.9 per cent higher than in 2008–12.
- The five largest arms exporters in 2018–22 were the United States, Russia, France, China and Germany. Together, they supplied 79 per cent of the world's arms exports in 2018–22.
- US arms exports accounted for 40 per cent of the global total in 2018–22 and rose to 44 per cent higher than in 2013–17.
- French arms exports increased by 44 per cent between 2013–17 and 2018–22, while Russian (–6 per cent), Chinese (–3 per cent) and German (–2 per cent) arms exports decreased.
- The five largest arms importers in 2018–22, India, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Australia and China, together received 39 per cent of the world's arms imports.
- The main recipient region in 2018–22 was Asia and Oceania (accounting for 31 per cent of global arms imports), followed by the Middle East (18 per cent), Europe (16 per cent), the Americas (8.9 per cent) and Africa (5.6 per cent).
- Arms imports by European states were 47 per cent higher in 2018–22 than in 2013–17. These by European NATO states were 41 per cent higher.
- Ukraine became a major importer of arms in 2022, by the 14th largest arms importer globally in the period and the 10th largest in 2022.

Figure 1. The trend in international transfers of major arms, 1993–2022. Note: The graph shows the average annual volume of arms transfers for 5-year periods and the line graph shows the annual total. The SIPRI trend indicator value (TIV) is a measure of the volume of international transfers of major arms. The method used for the SIPRI TIV is described in the Arms Transfers Database web page. Source: SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, March 2023.

¹ This fact sheet does not cover 'arms exports' and 'arms imports' as used to international transfers of major arms, defined by SIPRI.

Cooper, J. Russia's Military Expenditure During Its War Against Ukraine (SIPRI: June 2023)

Tian, N., Lopes da Silva, D., Liang, X., Scarazzato, L., Béraud-Sudreau, L. and Assis, A. Trends in World Military Expenditure, 2022 (SIPRI: April 2023)

Wezeman, P. D., Gadon, J. and Wezeman, S. T. Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2022 (SIPRI: March 2023)



Research staff



Dr Lucie Béraud-Sudreau is Director of the Military Expenditure and Arms Production Programme.



Dr Diego Lopes da Silva is a Senior Researcher with the SIPRI Military Expenditure and Arms Production Programme.



Dr Nan Tian is a Senior Researcher with the SIPRI Military Expenditure and Arms Production Programme.



Xiao Liang is a Research Assistant with the SIPRI Military Expenditure and Arms Production Programme.



Lorenzo Scarazzato is a Research Assistant with the SIPRI Military Expenditure and Arms Production Programme.

SIPRI Research

- ▼ Armament and disarmament
 - ▼ Arms and military expenditure
 - Arms production
 - International arms transfers
 - Military expenditure
 - Multilateral sanctions including arms embargoes
 - Transparency in military expenditure



- [Dual-use and arms trade control](#)
- [Emerging military and security technologies](#)

EU Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Consortium

- [Weapons of mass destruction](#)
- [Conflict, peace and security](#)
- [Peace and development](#)
- [Archived research](#)

SECTIONS

[RESEARCH](#)
[DATABASES](#)
[PUBLICATIONS](#)
[YEARBOOK](#)
[NEWS AND
EVENTS](#)
[MEDIA](#)
[COMMENTARY](#)

SIPRI

[ABOUT](#)
[GOVERNING BOARD](#)
[STAFF DIRECTORY](#)
[VACANCIES](#)
[SUPPORT SIPRI](#)
[CONTACT](#)
[PRIVACY](#)
[TERMS AND
CONDITIONS](#)



STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL
PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE

SIPRI is an independent international institute
dedicated to research into conflict, armaments,



arms control and disarmament. Established in 1966, SIPRI provides data, analysis and recommendations, based on open sources.

© SIPRI 2023



SUBSCRIBE TO THE
SIPRI UPDATE

Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute
SIPRI, Signalistgatan 9
SE-169 72 Solna
Sweden

Telephone/switchboard
+46 8 655 97 00

