 |
POLITICA |
Evo Morales No Che Guevara
By Ronald Bruce St John | January 9, 2006 Evo Morales,
president-elect of Bolivia, is often described in the Western media
as a “leftist” if not a reincarnation of the legendary
Ernesto “Che” Guevara. A mid-December article in The
Independent saw Morales walking “in the footsteps of Che Guevara”
while a more recent Los Angeles Times editorial was entitled, “Where
‘Che' Left Off.” Flaccid comparisons like these fuel
the conservative hysteria generated by Morales' election, adding
to the confusion as to the current political situation in Bolivia.
New Stage
Che Guevara arrived in Bolivia in November 1966, determined to
spark a revolution throughout South America. The first entry in
the diary he meticulously kept during his ill-fated Bolivian campaign
reads, “A new stage starts today.” He saw the remote
southeastern corner of Bolivia as a foco insurreccional, a catalyst
for a continent-wide revolution. His plan was to force the United
States to honor treaty obligations to defend the Western Hemisphere,
eventually bogging U.S. forces down in what he hoped would become
“another Vietnam.”
Guevara enjoyed a close but ambivalent relationship with Fidel
Castro. While he admired Castro, he had little regard for him as
either a political thinker or a military leader. In turn, Castro
felt a deep personal regard for Guevara but recognized he was dogmatic,
arrogant, and impetuous. Castro was especially annoyed by the Argentine-born
guerrilla's bid for the ideological leadership of the Cuban revolution.
Well before his arrival in Bolivia, Guevara sent Castro a confidential
letter, relieving himself of all government and political responsibilities,
including his rank of comandante and his status as a Cuban citizen.
In so doing, he freed Castro and the Cuban government from official
responsibility for his actions as a guerrilla leader.
Bolivian Revolution Morales-Style
In contrast to Guevara, Evo Morales has focused on a socioeconomic
and political revolution in Bolivia, not the Western Hemisphere.
Of Aymaran descent, he rose to national prominence as the leader
of the cocaleros (coca leaf producers) in the remote Chapare region.
Where Guevara was unable to attract indigenous support in Bolivia,
Morales won 54% of the votes in the December polls, and his election
marks the first time an indigenous politician has been elevated
to the Bolivian presidency.
The policies advocated by Morales and his political party, the
Movimiento Al Socialismo (MAS), resemble those of the leading opposition
parties. All of them agree that the core external issue is the efficient
exploitation of natural resources, primarily oil, and natural gas,
as part of a broader economic policy designed to grow foreign trade
and investment. Unanimity also exists on the need for land-locked
Bolivia to acquire a Pacific port, an issue at the top of the foreign
policy agenda since Chile occupied Bolivia's coastline during the
War of the Pacific (1879-1883).
While there is considerable agreement in Bolivia on the need to
better exploit its natural resources, Morales and MAS separate from
the opposition in insisting on some form of nationalization of the
oil and gas industries. That said, he has repeatedly ruled out the
confiscation or expropriation of assets as took place during the
Cuban revolution where Guevara served for a time as minister of
industry. Moreover, the MAS approach, determined to improve the
economic well-being of the dominant indigenous segment of the population,
has never advocated a Cuban-style brand of socialism.
Finally, Morales lacks the power base Castro and Guevara enjoyed
in Cuba and thus may soon find himself quite limited in what he
can accomplish. While Bolivia has the second-largest natural gas
reserves in the Western Hemisphere, together with sizeable oil reserves,
actual revenues at present are limited. And they will remain so
for the foreseeable future as the new government must renegotiate
contracts with international energy companies and attract new foreign
investment. In the meantime, Morales' shaky power base will become
even more precarious if he fails to deliver promised socioeconomic
gains to his supporters. MAS remains a loose amalgam of competing
social groups, all of which expect immediate gains from Morales'
election.
Building Bridges
In the wake of his impressive victory, Morales has displayed admirable
energy, reaching out to diverse constituencies in an apparent effort
at national reconciliation. He met with members of the Asociacíon
de Bancos Privados de Bolivia, a grouping of private bankers, as
well as other private businessmen around the country. In addition,
he traveled to Santa Cruz to meet with the Comité Civico
Pro Santa Cruz in recognition of Santa Cruz as the motor for national
development as well as the birthplace of the regional autonomy movement.
Morales drew repeated applause from his Santa Cruz audience, a group
harshly critical of him in the past, when he guaranteed a referendum
on regional autonomy and a constituent convention, together with
“no expropriation or confiscation” of private property
or assets.
Busy building bridges, Morales has come close to burning a few.
The day after his Santa Cruz visit, he spent all night celebrating
his victory with coca growers in the heart of the Chapare coca-growing
region. Repeating his pledge to reject U.S. pressure to reduce coca
production, he said, “we are winning the green battle; the
coca leaf is beating the North American dollar.” Even though
Morales has pledged to develop legal markets for coca and crack
down on drug trafficking, a close aide suggested recently that Bolivia
would reject U.S. economic and military aid, which approximated
$91 million in 2005, if it was contingent on continued coca-eradication
efforts.
On a more positive note, a late December decision by the European
Union to fund a study of coca distribution and use, in an effort
to determine how much of it goes to legal uses as opposed to cocaine
production, was a welcome initiative which promised to reduce the
rhetoric on both sides of the issue. About the same time, the International
Monetary Fund announced it would extend 100% debt relief to Bolivia,
an amount totaling approximately $231 million, as part of a multilateral
debt relief initiative.
“Axis of Good”
Returning from the Chapare, Morales made his first trip abroad
as president-elect, journeying to Havana where Cuban President Fidel
Castro warmly greeted him as a visiting head of state. In the past,
Morales has repeatedly declared himself an admirer of Castro and
vowed to become a “nightmare” for Washington. In the
course of this visit, Castro and Morales announced a 30-month plan
to erase illiteracy in Bolivia, and Cuba agreed to provide up to
50,000 free eye operations to needy Bolivians and 5,000 scholarships
for Bolivians to study medicine in Cuba. In turn, Morales distanced
himself from the Bush administration, stating he would not be pressured
by Washington.
Returning to La Paz, Morales enjoyed an hour-long meeting with
U.S. Ambassador David Greenlee in the latter's residence. Vice president-elect
Alvaro Garcia Linera, who also attended, put a friendly face on
the meeting, indicating the two sides spoke of democracy and drugs.
While the U.S. embassy refused comment, the Bush administration
used the encounter to reiterate early policy statements. In response
to a question the following day, State Department spokesperson Sean
McCormick stated the United States was willing to work with any
democratically elected government in the hemisphere as long as it
governed democratically. He added another condition in the Bolivian
case would be continued cooperation in the war on drugs.
One day after the Greenlee meeting, Morales embarked on a seven-nation
international tour, designed in part to demonstrate his capacity
to deal with world leaders. Venezuela was the first stop in a tour
which included Belgium, Brazil, China, France, South Africa, and
Spain. In Caracas, Morales proclaimed that he and Venezuelan President
Hugo Chávez were united in a “fight against neoliberalism
and imperialism.” Warmly praising both Castro and Chávez,
he embraced the Bush administration's severest critics as his role
models. Chávez termed the Castro-Chávez-Morales relationship
an “axis of good,” a play on President Bush's description
of prewar Iraq, Iran, and North Korea as an “axis of evil.”
The Venezuelan president also indicated he would supply Bolivia
with 150,000 barrels of diesel fuel a month, $30 million in financing
for social programs, and support for the policy to protect coca
crops against U.S. eradication campaigns.
European leaders greeted the Morales message cautiously during
his international tour, maintaining a certain distance from him.
In Spain, the president-elect assured business leaders they had
“nothing to fear” from his administration as Bolivia
welcomed “partners and business leaders” albeit “not
proprietors of our natural resources.” The Spanish government
agreed to forgive a “substantial” portion of Bolivia's
debt to Spain, but Prime Minister José Luis Rodríguez
Zapatero later refused to appear with Morales at a news conference
on the grounds it would breach diplomatic protocol for a sitting
prime minister to appear with a president-elect. At the European
Union, Javier Solana, the High Representative for Common Foreign
and Security Policy, assured Morales the EU would work with his
government but stressed how important it was for Bolivia to respect
private investment and support the war on drugs. Apparently taking
that message to heart, Morales emphasized during his subsequent
visit to France that his administration would cooperate in the drug
war as long as it was not a pretext for the maintenance of U.S.
control over Bolivia. Describing the international energy companies
as “partners,” he denounced “neoliberalism”
as the wrong answer to poverty.
Conclusion
As his inauguration draws near, Evo Morales has yet to define clearly
his policy platform. Immediately following his election, he wisely
reached out to private bankers and businessmen and courted the Comité
Civico Pro Santa Cruz, promising a climate favorable to jobs and
investment. At the same time, he talked in vague terms about the
need to gain control of Bolivia's natural resources and ensured
his cocalero supporters he would never adopt a coca cero (zero coca)
policy. But exactly how he plans to implement such policies remains
unclear.
Morales later sandwiched a La Paz meeting with U.S. Ambassador
Greenlee between visits to Fidel Castro in Cuba and Hugo Chávez
in Venezuela. While his supporters billed the Greenlee meeting as
“cordial,” the Bush administration quickly reiterated
its “wait-and-see” policy. Evo Morales is no Che Guevara.
Exactly who he is—and where he will take Bolivia—is
another question. Given the fuzzy policies articulated to date,
the answer may depend on which Morales shows up for the January
22 presidential inauguration.
Ronald Bruce St John, an analyst for Foreign Policy In Focus (www.fpif.org),
has published extensively on Latin American issues for over three
decades. Author of The Foreign Policy of Peru (1992) and La Política
Exterior del Perú (1999), he is working on a history of Bolivian
foreign policy.
|